










Title: Accounting for the great divide: Features of clarity in analytic philosophy journal articles

Abstract
While some limited studies exist examining philosophy texts (Bloor, 1996; Hyland, 2005), these focus exclusively on the analytic tradition. This study makes explicit the ‘great divide’ between analytic and continental philosophy by examining how the importance of clarity in analytic philosophy, largely connected to its alignment with scientific inquiry, influences use of certain linguistic features and distinguishes analytic from continental journal articles. Using a one-million word corpus along with input from disciplinary experts, findings include analytic philosophy’s tendency to limit lexical richness and use shorter sentences, self-mention, and imperative directives to a much greater extent than continental philosophy. This study has implications for further research on philosophy texts, students entering the discipline, and those who enable them to become members of this community. 

Introduction
Interest in the ways different academic disciplines write and speak has grown exponentially in recent years. Among academic genres, the research article has received particular attention, both in terms of its structure and organization (Swales, 1990; Ruiying & Allison, 2004) as well as linguistic features which either characterize the moves within that structure (Peacock, 2002; Bruce, 2008) or the discipline-specific genre itself (Hyland, 2002; 2005). Benefits to making explicit these features are obvious, particularly to students of those disciplines as well as those helping to prepare them for entry to and success therein.

Among the texts produced by different disciplines, philosophy texts are, according to many within the field, some of the hardest both to read and to learn to write. Manuals guiding newcomers to philosophy writing proliferate, one Professor of Philosophy noting that 
writing philosophy papers is difficult. It was no less so for me, your professor. Since I wrote well in all of my other classes, I was surprised and frustrated when my earliest philosophy papers were sharply criticized instead of being roundly praised (Stephens, 2012).
And yet, limited and incomplete attention has been paid to philosophy texts by linguists. What work exists has tended to focus on one particular tradition within philosophy, analytic philosophy (AP), as opposed to the other prominent tradition, continental philosophy (CP), usually without stating so explicitly. What work does exist includes Bloor’s (1996) discussion of hypothetical strategies, for example, which examines in detail a small number of journal articles on philosophy of language, arguably a sub-field of AP (see Ammerman, 1990). He notes that the use of hypothetical strategies, particularly Twin Earth, in AP journal articles function as a tool allowing the writer to isolate a single variable, as in experimental design.

Swales et al (1998) includes 5 (presumably AP, though not stated explicitly) philosophy articles in their examination of use of imperatives across ten disciplines, reporting that ‘Philosophy…is clearly one of the imperative-using scholarly fields’ (p. 115) as opposed to other soft sciences where imperatives tend to occur only in footnotes. They go on to offer explanations from philosophers, who note the influence of mathematical language on their imperatives use, the avoidance of longer conditional clauses that imperatives facilitates, and the ability of imperatives to direct the audience to stop and reflect on particular points. 

Other work on philosophy texts includes Samraj’s (2008) analysis of the move structure of the introductions of biology, philosophy, and linguistic master’s theses. She finds that while AP master’s thesis introductions bear similarity to those in linguistics in some ways, there is evidence that the remaining chapters have features similar to those of biology theses, both adopting what Samraj calls a ‘topical focus’ as the main organizing principle. Like others who have analyzed such texts, Samraj does not make clear in which tradition the philosophy theses are written, although the attention she draws to the centrality of a ‘problem or issue’ suggests that they were written from an analytical rather than a continental perspective on philosophy.

Hyland has published extensively on disciplinary discourse, focusing on such features as evaluative that (Hyland & Tse, 2004) and directives (2002) as well as other features of stance and engagement (2005) using a corpus compiled from a wide range of disciplines, including philosophy, although his list of philosophy journals contains only those in the analytic tradition. Among his findings is significantly higher use of reader reference, questions, and self-mention in AP texts when compared to texts from other soft sciences.  Hyland’s (2002) research also reveals that philosophy (i.e. AP) journal articles use directives, particularly cognitive forms, with a similar frequency to that in the hard sciences. He argues that the amount and type of directives in philosophy texts stems from a focus on creating a sense of communal intimacy. Interestingly, he argues in a later section that directives in the hard sciences are connected to value placed on succinctness and precision and ‘offer writers…economy and…so allow them to cut to the heart of an argument without more space consuming locutions’ (p. 235). He contrasts this with the humanities (within which he assumedly includes philosophy), which enjoy fewer time and space constraints. 

In summary, the similarities between AP texts (again, treated in the existing literature as simply philosophy texts) and scientific texts are only briefly mentioned in the literature but not explored completely nor made fully explicit. Nor, does it seem, exist any attempts by linguists at examining the texts produced within different traditions of philosophy. Some might argue that fragmenting the disciplinary discourse into sub-disciplinary discourse (possibly ad-infinitum) is neither fruitful nor necessary, still others that linguists are wise to avoid entering the arguably heated discussion of AP vs. CP. However, given the prominence of the division between AP and CP in philosophy literature, some attempt at examining linguistic features of texts from different philosophical traditions is justified. Such an examination will illuminate the extent to which this divide is born out in textual features and provide potential students with accurate expectations of how philosophy writing differs from other academic writing.

This paper will therefore begin with a rationale for moving away from viewing philosophy as one discipline and an attempt to elucidate the concepts of clarity and precision central to AP, moving on to details of the research methodology of the present study. Then, findings will be presented from a corpus of philosophy texts which further support the notion that future research on philosophy texts must account for and make explicit the types of philosophy involved as well as the extent to which values in those types influence linguistic features. 

The Great Divide
Levy (2003: 284) notes that ‘Since the early twentieth century, Western philosophy has been split into two apparently irreconcilable camps: the “analytic” and the “continental”’. While some argue strongly that this divide no longer exists or that some philosophers successfully identify with both traditions equally (see Levy, 2003), a review of the literature on the subject suggests that identification with one or the other is still an important source of identity for many philosophers (Dolcini, 2007; Trakakis, 2007). A recent In Our Time episode on BBC Radio4 entitled ‘The Continental-Analytic Divide’ supports this conclusion, wherein the speakers discussed the origin of the split (for an account of these origins, see Dolcini, 2007) as well as the extent to which it is rooted in and perpetuated by particular values.  

 In this programme and in the philosophy literature, the divide is discussed in terms of: 
	Geography, although this fails as analytic philosophy has its roots in mainland Europe just as does continental philosophy (Levy, 2003)
	Historical origins, i.e. the standard thinkers identified with each (Levy, 2003)
	Attitudes towards history (AP focuses on eternal problems vs. CP focuses on historically-situated problems)
	Content and sub-disciplines (CP as historical/political vs. AP as systematic/scientific approach)
	Style, i.e. argument vs. rhetoric; CP is more ‘literary’ than analytic philosophy (Engel, 1999)
	Relationship between philosophical tradition and other disciplines such as science and literature (see Dolcini, 2007)

It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss each of these points in detail. The relevant points to take from these are, first, that despite the fact that CP texts tend to vary more widely in individual style than do AP texts, CP has been characterized by its emphasis on inclusion of historical and cultural context in texts and its stylistic similarities with softer disciplines such as literature, history, politics, sociology, and psychology. Some have described CP as tending to function as the anti-science, bordering on obscurantism or the rejection of causal explanations (Critchley, 2001). McGrath (2008: 56), taking Heidegger as a CP example, explores the stylistic implications of these tendencies, citing what he refers to as poetic features, such as ‘repetition, equivocation, and metaphor’ as well as ‘impressionistic language’, which he argues blurs distinctions between important concepts and, perhaps deliberately, undermines AP’s focus on calculative reasoning. Nick Trakakis, who has examined and written about both CP and AP traditions, notes about CP texts, 
One will usually find a language that makes use of a wide range of literary tropes and strategies, including undefined neologisms, parables and pseudonymous discourses, elaborate word-plays and paradoxical turns of speech, hyperbole, irony and metaphor, and so on (2012: 928).

Second, the concepts of clarity and precision are central to AP philophers, who viewing themselves as scientists, place emphasis on carefully dissecting research problems into their parts, only after which they can be resolved (Trakakis, 2007). It is assumed within AP that by writing with sufficient clarity, a problem can be dissected into its parts, understood completely, and solved. Hylton (1998: 37), writing from the AP perspective, notes, ‘It is supposed that philosophical problems vanish, or become soluble, or at least can for the first time be seen for what they, if only we write about them with sufficient clarity’. 

AP philosophers believe their task to be similar to scientific inquiry, forming hypotheses then testing and disseminating findings for wider discussion amongst peers (Engel, 1999; Leiter, 2006). Some more enthusiastic analytic philosophers argue that insofar as there is any respectable philosophy, it had better be part of the natural sciences (see Quine, 1969). 

It is these concepts of clarity and precision, viewed as derived from mathematics and the sciences, which seem to be used most often to characterize the divide. Attempts to define these terms in much detail are sparse, however. Williams (2011: xvi) refers to clarity simply as ‘plain speech’. Trakakis (2007) defines clarity as ‘simplicity of style’, ‘short, crisp and concise sentences’, ‘avoiding rhetorical embellishments’, use of ‘ordinary language’ and defines precision as ‘defining key terms’, ‘use of technical vocabulary when necessary’, and ‘fine-grained analysis’. According to Stephens’ (2012) manual for beginning philosophy students, the AP conception of clarity requires the philosopher to 
Make your meaning as plain as you can. Don't obscure your ideas with awkward sentences or polysyllabic words dredged up from your thesaurus. Use words you understand, spell them correctly, and put them in straightforward, grammatical, properly punctuated, complete sentences.
Further definitions are difficult to find, although the consensus is that clarity, as defined within AP, distinguishes good philosophy from bad. 

While clarity is valued to various extents by many disciplines, not just AP, each discipline defines and manifests (or not) clarity in particular ways. For example, as Suchan and Dulek (1990: 90) point out, within business communication, while clarity is supreme, ‘standards of clarity differ, based on organization culture’. The authors offer the striking example of academics specializing in organizational behavior identifying textual features such as abstract language and nominalization as ‘clear and precise’ where specialists of other areas had declared the same features some of the least clear. Within the hard sciences, clarity is deeply valued and defined as ‘sense in the fewest short words…Literary devices, metaphors and the like, divert attention from substance to style’ (Day & Gastel, 2011: 5). Despite such variation, much of the work on clear writing has looked at the extent to which a particular text type conforms to prescribed notions of clarity, using, for example, the Flesch Reading Ease Score (see Hartley, Sotto, & Fox, 2004) which uses average sentence length, number of affixes, and number of references to people to determine text readability. 

This study will look particularly at the concept of clarity as it is defined within AP and manifested in philosophy writing. In order to understand further the importance of this rarely defined concept in AP texts, I sought the advice of a Professor of Philosophy (self-described as coming from the AP tradition) from a leading UK university. Initially, she described manifestations of clarity as ‘rather intuitive’. However, while talking through an example of an AP PhD thesis, which she described as lacking sufficient clarity, she identified the following features as essential to AP’s notion of clarity:
1.	use of numbered sentences to facilitate presentation of an argument
2.	avoidance of language associated with personal interests, feelings, and commitments
3.	use of counterexamples 
4.	use of I to differentiate others’ arguments from one’s own
5.	limited use of synonyms, i.e. if a word fits, use it again and again
She explained, ‘Don’t vary vocabulary just for the sake of variation’.
6.	avoidance of complex syntax (particularly shorter sentences)
While evidence exists that self-mention (point 4 above) is important in most, if not all, of the soft sciences (Hyland, 2001), Hyland (2005) demonstrates that AP journal articles contain the highest frequency of self-mention of all the soft sciences (5.7 per 1000 words). He quotes an AP philosopher to offer explanation,
The personal pronoun ‘I’ is very important in philosophy. It not only tells people that it is your own unique point of view, but that you believe what you are saying. It shows your colleagues where you stand in relation to the issues and in relation to where they stand on them. It marks out the difference.
Hyland summarizes this perspective by arguing that self-mention helps the reader to clearly identify who the writer is and what they have to say. 

The disciplinary expert’s mention of limited lexical variation and avoidance of complex syntax as features which distinguish AP from CP are also echoed in the literature, as mentioned previously (see again Trakakis, 2007). 

Following on then from these suggestions from both the literature and insider informant data, the present study will focus on points 4 through 6. A further feature to examine in CP vs. AP texts is directives, given previous findings that their frequency in (analytic) philosophy texts are similar to the hard sciences, where they function as aids to accomplishing clarity (Hyland, 2002). The research questions for this study are therefore, as follows:

1.	To what extent does the value of a particular notion of clarity, as expressed by means of self-mention, limited vocabulary variation, shorter sentence length, and directives, distinguish AP journal articles from CP journal articles?
2.	How do these findings compare to previous findings on AP philosophy texts and on texts produced within the hard sciences?
	
Methodology
This project was divided into three stages, combining unstructured interviews and e-mail correspondence with professors of philosophy in the UK with compilation and analysis of a corpus of philosophy journal articles from two main ‘camps’: analytic and continental.
 
Stage 1 involved gathering information about key values and features of and distinctions between analytic and continental philosophy as well as advice regarding leading journals associated with the two branches. To that end, I conducted an unstructured interview with a Professor of (Analytic) Philosophy (see previous section) and engaged in e-mail correspondence with a Professor of (Continental) Philosophy who also runs several websites devoted to continental philosophy. 

In stage 2, I compiled two corpora of philosophy journal articles using advice from the 2 insider informants as well as lists of journals acquired from the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (see Appendix 1), resulting in the following two sub-corpora:
Continental (5 Journals, 65 articles): 501,361 words
Analytic (5 Journals, 70 articles): 492,557 words
The most recently published articles from each journal, starting from 2011 and going back, were chosen. These texts were collected as pdfs and converted to text files. All formulas composed of numbers and symbols were removed from AP files, and all abstracts and footnotes were removed from both sub-corpora because of the significant variation between journals.  This led to stage 3, involving analysis of the corpus using Antconc, focusing on the features identified in the previous stages, described below, and qualitative analysis of 2 sample texts against which corpus analysis results were compared. 

Self-mention (use of I, me, mine, my, myself, we, our, ours, ourselves, us)




This is linked to the view (see point 5 above) that AP texts attempt precision by limiting vocabulary variation, whereas CP texts allow for greater variety. In order to investigate lexical variation, standardized type/token ratio (STTR) was compared in each sub-corpus (see Tweedie & Baayen, 1998). 

Average sentence length (ASL)
As indicated before, analytic philosophers claim to use short, crisp, concise sentences when compared with the CP tradition.

Directives
Directives function as a type of engagement with the reader, signaling that the reader is obliged to carry out or not carry out some action (Hyland, 2001). Directives can function as textual acts (referring the reader to a place in a text), physical acts (directing the reader to perform some action in the real world), or cognitive acts ‘where readers are initiated into a new domain of argument [rhetorical], led through a line of reasoning [elaborative], or directed to understand a point in a certain way [emphatic]’ (Hyland, 2002: 217). Directives are manifested in: 
1.	imperatives (Consider the following argument by Schiffer against the Fregean model of ‘that’-clauses.), 
2.	modals of obligation (We should conclude that CK believes all these very different propositions under the same MP. 
3.	predicative adjectives (In order to have such a falsification, it is essential that the very same subject does so.)
Use of certain directives can be linked to value placed on clarity, as defined by those within AP, in that they ‘allow [the writer] to cut to the heart of an argument without more space consuming locutions’ (Hyland, 2002: 235). In particular, imperatives offer the reader ‘the most vigorous and readable style’ (Booth, 1993: 28) and the most obvious direction.

Following on from Hyland’s work (2002; 2005), this study paid particular attention to cognitive directives, including rhetorical, elaborative, and emphatic, focusing particularly on imperatives as distinguishing features of AP vs. CP journal articles, though the directive forms searched for in the corpus included all of those listed in Hyland (2002). A few problems surfaced as a result of using this list. For example, while Hyland lists both ‘let A=B’ (let followed by a formula) and ‘let’s’, he does not include ‘let us’, a fairly frequent form in AP. In order to ensure that all directives, particularly imperatives, were included in my analysis, I therefore searched for any verbs occurring at the start of sentences and after commas or colons. Concordance lines were also carefully examined to rule out any search results which could not be considered directives. 

Two texts, one AP journal article from Mind and one CP article from Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, were selected to provide examples of use of features for discussion. These texts were chosen both because they used the features in question in ways consistent with their larger respective sub-corpora and for their interesting use of some of the features. 

Findings
Findings indicate that AP and CP texts differed substantially in every category (see Table 1), each of which will be discussed in the next sections. Hyland’s (2005) results, particularly those pertaining to his sub-corpus of 30 AP articles, are provided in Table 2 for purposes of comparison. 

	Self-mention (per 1,000 words)	Average WPS	STTR	Directives (per 10,000 words)
Analytic	10.14	30.04	32.8%	67.38
Continental	4.17	38.89	40.03%	34.007






Table 2: Relevant results from Hyland (2005), per 1,000 words

Self-mention
The use of self-mention in the AP sub-corpus (10.14) was significantly higher than in the CP sub-corpus (4.17). The AP results are nearly double that reported in Hyland (2005), a surprising difference which may be explained by the smaller size and different makeup of Hyland’s sub-corpus (30 AP journal articles from 10 journals).  

The frequency of type of self-mention was fairly similar, with ‘I’ used at least three times more frequently in both corpora than any other type (AP: 3,277 uses; CP: 1,424 uses). Plural personal pronouns functioned almost exclusively as reader reference, even within the multi-authored articles in the corpus. It is worth noting, however, that particularly within the AP sub-corpus, reader reference was prolific and interplay between plural personal pronouns and reader reference/self-mention particularly complex and worth exploring in more detail elsewhere. 

The two sample texts both contained self-mention. In the AP text, self-mention appears 5.29 times per 1,000 words and in the CP text, 4.93 times, figures different from the rest of the corpus, although in both cases, the functions of this feature were consistent with each corresponding sub-corpus. Examination of the following extracts sheds some light on the function of self-mention:
1.	It is often said that there are propositions which involve only logical constituents but which are nevertheless contingent: the standard examples are propositions about the number of things, such as that there are at least five things, understood in the usual way in terms of quantification and identity. Now these supposed counterexamples are very possibly misguided: I myself am inclined to think that they are.
2.	Now, most philosophers today tend to be (perhaps often uncritically) rather pluralistic about basic logical entities or notions: they think that these include negation, conjunction, quantification, identity, necessity, set-membership, and maybe a few more or a few less. Such philosophers will, I fear, be prone to take the consequences just noted as a reductio ad absurdum of the adequacy of the above definition of logicality (or at most they might be motivated to find some modification of the definition which avoided the consequences).
3.	For surely the source of contingency is always the haps and mishaps of empiricalia, whereas Logic alone is responsible for necessity (and impossibility). (Here I suppose I ought to say, `pace Kripke & Co.'.)
4.	One might try to explicate this lack of `robustness' in terms of invariance of truth-value, or invariance of corresponding intensional proposition, under replacement of constituents. Although I do not by any means wish to deny the general interest of this sort of idea, still the attempt to apply it to the present task raises some delicate problems.
(AP Text)
5.	But suppose we did try to reproduce a poem in prose…Here are the lines…And here is my translation:
6.	Schopenhauer claims it is possible to translate faithfully. I gather no one would dispute the deficiency of my attempt.			
7.	Energies present, I would suggest, in the everyday gulf-stream drift of words, words that occur to you through the viscous facility of empirical forms themselves - because this word rhymes with that, or scans with it, or reminds you of it - or simply because it happened, one day, to wash up on the shore of awareness. The whole receptive dimension of our lives with language is what the Schopenhauerian poet has to resist; this is the noise that endangers the meaning he wants to assert.
8.	I have said this energy is alien to the intellect: what does that mean? And what exactly powers these invasive non-conceptual Dionysian insights? The energy is alien because it works along a precisely contrary tangent.
		(CP Text)

Self-mention seems to function quite differently in the two texts. In the AP text, the author uses it primarily to assert his presence into the discussion (extracts 1, 2, and 4). In these examples, the author begins with a widely held point of view (a perspective ‘often said’ in extract 1, an idea held by ‘most philosophers’ in extract 2, and a tempting idea attracting ‘general interest’ in extract 4), after which the author’s presence becomes known. AP extract 1 is particularly interesting, where the writer’s self is over-emphasized, two pronouns being used instead of one. While this double self-mention does not occur with much frequency in the larger AP sub-corpus, it nevertheless demonstrates the value AP writers place on distinguishing their arguments from others’. In extracts 2 and 4, the author’s use of self-mention seems also to be encouraging a kind of principled skepticism. While self-mention in extract 3 serves a different function, to clarify potentially ambiguous points, the end goal appears the same: making the author and his arguments clear. 

Self-mention in the CP text also seems to function as a means of asserting authorial presence but with less emphasis on the unique position of the author as opposed to the positions of others in the field. Rather, it seems to be used primarily to engage with the reader, in some instances even to appeal for the reader’s agreement (extracts 6, 7). Where AP seems to use self-mention primarily to mark the author out, CP seems to use it in a way more typical of the soft sciences, to accomplish engagement with the reader (see Hyland, 2001). 

Vocabulary Variation
The STTR calculation for each sub-corpora reveals that the AP texts had approximately 8% less variation than the CP texts (see Table 1). Following this pattern, the sample AP text had an STTR of 30.07, compared to an STTR of 41.97 in the sample CP text. This suggests that, consistent with what the disciplinary expert reported, for analytic philosophers, if a word fits, they will use it repeatedly rather than risk ambiguity. 

While I could find no published research looking at this feature of philosophy texts specifically against which to compare these findings, research examining other corpora reveals that the STTR of the FLOB (Freiburg–LOB Corpus of British English), for example, is 43.6 whereas that in the DaSciTex (Darmstadt Scientific Text) Corpus is 34.0 (Teich & Fankhauser, 2009), figures somewhat comparable to those calculated here. This indicates that AP text writers do seem to prize use of a smaller range of vocabulary, similar to writers within the hard sciences, a value which can be linked to their similar notion of clarity. As Day and Gastel (2011: 216) write in their manual How to Write and Publish a Scientific Paper, ‘For clarity in scientific writing, keep using the same word for the same thing. Do not feel compelled to vary your vocabulary, as you might in a literary piece.’

Average Sentence Length
ASL was 38.9 in the CP sub-corpus and 30.03 in the AP sub-corpus, indicating that AP writers tend to use shorter sentences, consistent with their claims. Given that AP texts tend to list numbered points and/or equations in an argument without punctuation, the ASL figure for these texts is likely to be even lower were these lists to be removed. 

In the sample texts, there are some anomalies. The ASL in the CP text is 24 (well below the average for the sub-corpus), compared with an average of 26 in the AP text. Looking more broadly, the ASL for Mind is 30, consistent with the overall average for the sub-corpus. On the other hand, the ASL for all articles from the Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology is only 33, driven down by four papers whose ASL are all below 25. The anomaly for this particular paper may be explained therefore by the specific journal in which it appears or even by the particular style of the writer. 

In summary, then, there is some evidence that AP journal articles, in general, contain shorter sentences than do CP journal articles, though certainly some anomalies exist which may be attributed to journal particularities or to individual writer style. While no studies could be found reporting on ASL in AP or CP philosophy texts, some work has been done looking at ASL across hard and soft sciences. Hartley, Sotto and Fox (2004) report an ASL of 33.1 in their corpus of journal articles in the hard sciences, and Broadhead, Berlin, and Broadhead (1982) report an increase in ASL when moving from articles in engineering to natural sciences, social sciences and humanities. This indicates, once again, that AP texts share some textual similarities with scientific texts. 

Directives





Table 3: Types of Directives (percent)

Cognitive directives, which included most of the imperative forms, made up the highest percentage of directives in both sub-corpora (see Table 3), consistent with Hyland’s (2002) findings regarding AP research articles. While my corpus revealed significantly fewer textual directives in the AP articles (6.27% of all directives) than was reported in Hyland (2002) (16.3%), see was the most frequently used textual directive in both sub-corpora, as Hyland also reports. The only other textual directive, used only in AP, was look. Despite these similarities, however, some key differences emerge between CP and AP use which previous research has not made clear.

First, the AP texts used significantly more imperative cognitive forms, which constituted 34.78% of all directives in the AP sub-corpus as opposed to only 8.29% in the CP sub-corpus. Particularly frequent imperative forms in the AP texts include suppose, let, and consider. Typical examples of these can be seen below, taken from the sample AP text:

1.	Conversely, suppose p is a union of M-blocks.
2.	As for entirely about, suppose first that, intuitively, p is entirely about M…
3.	Let us give some examples.
4.	Let p be any intentional proposition…

The use of imperative forms in the AP sub-corpora are consistent with the findings both of Swales et al (1998) and Hyland (2002), though, again, CP texts were not accounted for in these studies. It’s clear that space-saving forms, such as imperatives, hold a key position in AP texts but not CP texts, which, as we have already shown, tend to contain longer sentences and seem to value succinctness less. 

Second, findings with regard to modal directives also point to the importance of clarifying which tradition of philosophy is being researched and help to explain why imperative cognitive directive forms are so frequent. Hyland (2002) reports that the less threatening should is used more frequently than must in his corpus of philosophy research articles. However, these findings were only consistent with those from the AP sub-corpus, where should made up 22.5% of all directives and must 16.73%. On the other hand, in the CP sub-corpus, occurrences of must accounted for 38.19% of all directives, as opposed to should, which amounted to 25.46%. In the two sample texts, must and should are used with similar frequency to their larger sub-corpora, where they are distributed throughout without any clear patterning. Looking more broadly at the concordance plot for each sub-corpus, neither modal form seems to cluster in any particular part of the text. Possible implications for AP’s greater use of softer modal directives and the way in which this can be linked to value placed on clarity will be explored in the next section.

Discussion
The main goal of this study was to establish the extent to which a focus on achieving clarity results in AP journal articles which can be clearly distinguished from those in CP, particularly in terms of such features as self-mention, vocabulary variation, average sentence length, and use of directives, particularly imperative forms. Based on the consistence with which AP philosophers view their work as being similar to scientific inquiry, a secondary aim was to compare the use of these features in AP texts not only with that in similar philosophy corpora but also in scientific texts, as reported in the literature. Overall, findings reveal that in its use of these features, AP differentiates itself from CP and aligns with scientific inquiry by means of accomplishing its notion of clarity in similar ways. 

The corpus revealed much greater use of self-mention in the AP texts than in the CP text. This is consistent with AP’s notion of clarity as it seemed to serve, primarily, to mark out the writer and make obvious the distinction between the writer’s ideas and the ideas of others. Mason (1999: 74) notes that through use of self-mention, 
Authors make their intentions clear. These intentions determine the meaning of the sentences for the projected reader. The clarity that analytic philosophy prizes so highly comes from this straightforwardness. 
The frequent use of self-mention in AP texts might seem at odds with AP’s connections with the hard sciences and its focus on objectivity and empiricism. However, the age-old rule that science advocates against use of personal pronouns is outdated and has been proven false. Day and Gastel (2011: 199) note that avoidance of self-mention sacrifices clarity and should therefore be reconsidered.
Because of this [avoiding first-person pronouns], the scientist commonly uses verbose (and imprecise) statements such as ‘It was found that’ in preference to the short, unambiguous ‘I found’. Young scientists should renounce the false modesty of their predecessors. Do not be afraid to name the agent of the action in a sentence, even when it is ‘I’ or ‘we’. 

The corpus also revealed that, using STTR as a measure, AP journal articles are less lexically rich than CP articles, arguably with the intention of avoiding vague (lacking clear meaning) or ambiguous (having the possibility of more than one meaning) language. Writing about avoiding vagueness in philosophy, Sorenson (2012) argues that the clearest philosophical texts use and reuse a precise term or else state clearly how a new term is to be used. Similarly, Alley (1998: 76) notes that the best scientific writers ‘don’t hesitate to repeat a word if that word is the right word’, describing unnecessary variation like synonym use as ‘inexact’. On the other hand, lexical richness seems to be valued more highly in CP texts, perhaps because it tends to enjoy more freedom from the strict standards of science and logic. 

ASL calculations revealed that AP articles are characterized by shorter sentences than CP articles, consistent with what is reported in the literature and by the discipline experts in this study. Similar ASL has been reported in corpora of scientific texts and recommended in published guidelines for writing scientific papers (see Sierra et al, 1992). The connections with AP’s notion of clarity are obvious: short sentences are, generally speaking, easier to follow than longer ones in that they, for example, place fewer demands on working memory and require the writer to choose words carefully and avoid verbosity. However, some caveats are in order. Sentences can be shorter but more obtuse, as in ‘God is grace’ (Hartley, Sotto, and Fox, 2004: 204), particularly when the reader lacks background knowledge of the topic under discussion. The excerpts from the AP text might therefore have been clear for the AP audience but less so for the layperson. Further, some disciplines may identify clarity with longer sentences in some cases, valuing the addition of qualifying clauses and phrases towards overall precision of argumentation. 

Hyland (2002) suggests that the use of directives creates a sense of communal intimacy in academic texts. With regard to AP texts, this is certainly true to some extent; however, there is a deeper issue here, linked again to the value placed on clarity. Justification for this link lies in AP’s seeming reluctance to use more threatening (and arguably more audience engaging) modal directives (such as must) when compared with CP. Silk (2013: 2) elaborates, noting that for the AP philosopher, must is appropriate only in rare cases where one can ‘commit to settling on the truth of [the] assertion for the remainder of the conversation’. Imperatives are therefore used less to engage with the audience and more to accomplish precision regarding certainty of thought, in a way similar to the hard sciences. In summary, when compared to the CP writer, the difference between must and should seems more important to the AP philosopher, who only chooses must when he is absolutely certain that it is justified. 

Closing Remarks
This paper has described features in AP journal articles which distinguish it from CP articles and which indicate that AP continues in its tradition of valuing and accomplishing clarity in a way that is similar to scientific writing. In doing so, this paper has focused on looking at an approximately 1 million word corpus primarily from an AP perspective. This is intentional. It’s important to note that within philosophy, as within any discipline, tremendous variation can and does exist, depending on individual writers’ style and values, and this is particularly true in CP. Future attempts at descriptions of philosophy texts should, therefore, account for the great divide but also examine the extent to which individual traditions within philosophy (both within and across AP and CP) create and perpetuate their own disciplinary cultures. In particular, research investigating AP’s claim to avoid language portraying personal interests, feelings, and commitment would build on understanding of how clarity manifests itself. 

Limitations to this study include its focus on a selection of texts from a selection of journals; while expert input was obtained for this process, there will certainly be those who disagree with how certain journals have been characterized or grouped together. 
There are many who view AP’s associations with scientism and CP’s tendency towards obscurantism as being the worst excesses of philosophy and advocate ‘approaching the still hidden centre between the two philosophical cultures’ (Critchley, 2001: 121). As an outsider to philosophy, it is not my goal to comment on what philosophy should be but rather what different texts produced within it seem to demonstrate. As the AP discipline expert who contributed to this study indicated, philosophy departments find it challenging to acculturate students entering the discipline, given the distinct nature of AP texts. This study therefore has implications for new students to the discipline, both native speakers of English and those for whom English is an additional language, as well as those who prepare them for success therein.
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